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On emergence and causality in the living world
Luciano Boi
We discuss the concept of emergence, and try to 
show that it is one of the most significant issues in 
the study of complex living systems. We stress par-
ticularly that emergent properties possess a specific 
causal power, which is not reducible to the power of 
their constituents. The emergence of physiological 
functions is profoundly related to the self-organized 
dynamics of biological systems. The increasing com-
plexity of cellular and organismal activity favors the 
emergence of novelties and the integration of the 
active parts into an autonomous whole.
EMERGENCE CAUSALITY SELF-ORGANIZATION 
EPIGENETICS COMPLEXITY PARTS AND WHOLE
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I. Introduction
This essay is aimed at highlighting the important fact that the specificity of complex 
biological activity does not arise from the specificity of the individual molecules that 
are involved, as these components frequently function in many different processes. 
For instance, genes that affect memory formation in the fruit fly encode proteins in 
the cyclic AMP (camp) signaling pathway that are specific to memory. It is the par-
ticular cellular compartment and environment in which a second messenger, such a 
camp, is released that allow a gene product to have a unique effect. Biological specific-
ity results from the way in which these components assemble and function together. 
More precisely, we attempt at showing that complex biological levels of functionality 
result from self-organized processes. 
For self-organization to act on macroscopic cellular structures, three re-
quirements must be fulfilled: (i) a cellular structure must be dynamic; (ii) material 
must be continuously exchanged; and (iii) an overall stable configuration must be 
generated from dynamic components. Interactions between the parts, as well as in-
fluences from the environment, give rise to new features, such as network and col-
lective behaviors which are absent in the isolated components. Consequently ‘emer-
gence’ has appeared as a new concept that complements ‘reduction’ when reduction 
fails. Emergent properties resist any attempt at being predicted or deduced by explic-
itly calculation or any other means. In this regard, emergent properties differ from 
resultant properties, which can be defined from low-level configurations and infor-
mation. For instance, the resultant mass of a multi-component protein assembly is 
simply equal to the sum of the mass of each individual component. However, the 
way in which we taste the saltiness of sodium chloride is not reducible to the prop-
erties of sodium and chloride gas. An important aspect of emergent properties is 
that they have their own causal power, which is not reducible to the power of their 
constituents. 
The key concepts here are those of ‘organization’ and ‘regulation’, first of 
all because organization and regulation become cause in the living matter of mor-
phological, functional and mental novelties. According to the principle of emergence, 
the natural and living worlds are organized into stages and levels that have evolved 
over different evolutionary times through continuous and discontinuous process-
es. Reductionists advocate the idea of ‘upward causation’ by which molecular states 
generally bring about higher-level phenomena, whereas proponents of emergence 
admit ‘downward causation’ by which higher-level systems may influence lower-lev-
el configurations. We would like to underline the philosophical importance of admit-
ting ‘downward causation’ in the analysis of complex living systems (i.e. presenting 
and ever-increasing coupled activity of plasticity and complexity) by showing that 
chromatin forms and its structural modifications play a crucial role in the increasing 
complexity of gene regulatory networks, in the emergence of cellular functions and 
in development, as well as in the neurocognitive plasticity.  
In order to make clear from the outset the content and meaning of what 
we mean by emergence, we want to stress the following features of that concept. It 
cannot be simply deduced or predicted from low-level elements. It implies that na-
ture and living organisms exhibit different levels of organization and regulation (for 
living systems). Emergent phenomena may have causal power, especially downward 
causation. They depend on the openness and nonlinearity of the system in which 
they appear. Emergent properties are systemic and therefore they not concern the 
single elements or parts of the system. They generally appear at higher and complex 
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levels of organization; more precisely, they arise from self-organizing phenomena. 
Finally, we should highlight that these features of the notion of emergence play a very 
important role in biological processes, and they are not necessarily or completely sat-
isfied in other disciplines, especially in physics.
II. The challenge of biological complexity: self-organization,  
emergence of novelties and the integration of the parts into a whole 
The principal challenge facing systems biology is complexity. Systems biology defines 
and analyses the interrelationships of all the elements in a functioning system in or-
der to understand how the systems works. At the core of the challenge is the need for 
a new approach, a shift from reductionism to an integrative perspective. More pre-
cisely, what is needed is to provide a conceptual framework for system biology re-
search. The concept of a complex system, i.e. a system of subsystems each belong-
ing to a certain category of living entities such as proteins, tissues, organs, etc., need 
first to be defined in general mathematical terms. It is rather clear, however, that for 
a deeper understanding in systems biology investigations should go beyond building 
numerical mathematical or computer models – important as they are. Biological phe-
nomena cannot be predicted with the level of numerical precision as in classical phys-
ics. Explanations in terms of how the categories of systems are organized to function 
in ever changing conditions are more revealing. Non-numerical mathematical tools 
are appropriate for the task. Such a categorical perspective led us to propose that the 
core of understanding in systems biology depends rather on the search for organiz-
ing principles than solely on construction of predictive descriptions (i.e. models) that 
exactly outline the evolution of systems in space and time.
Biological systems are difficult to study because they are complex in several 
ways. One of the most important aspects of biological complexity is multi-levelness: 
the structural and functional organization of the human body into tissues and organs 
systems composed of cells. From molecules to organs, levels are inter-related and in-
terdependent, so that the organism is able to conserve and adopt the integrity of its 
structural and functional organization against a setting of continuous changes with-
in the organism and its environment. This capacity, usually described as ‘robustness’, 
is a consequence of non-linear spatial-temporal intra- and inter-cellular interactions. 
To understand disease-relevant processes, we therefore require methodol-
ogies that allow us to study non-linear spatial-temporal systems with multiple lev-
els of structural and functional organization. Non-linear dynamics plays an important 
role for the explanation of highly non-linear biological behaviors such as biochemical 
and cellular rhythms or oscillations. According to biodynamics, biological systems are 
seen as open systems of non-linearly interacting elements. Consequently, the field 
of biodynamics might be defined as the study of the complex web of non-linear dy-
namical interactions between and among molecules, cells and tissues, which give rise 
to the emergent functions of a biological system as a whole. The work of non-linear 
dynamical interactions favors the self-organization of emergent macroscopic pat-
terns, including temporal oscillations and spatial-temporal wave patterns, especially 
in chemical and biological systems. Numerous examples are now known at all levels 
of biological organization. The formation of biological rhythms and oscillatory dy-
namical states of different periodicities plays a fundamental role in living organisms.
The processes that underlie cellular oscillators are organized in complex-
ly coupled biochemical networks, wherein feed-forward and feedback information 
flows provide the links between the different levels in the hierarchy of cell biochemical 
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network organization. Such networks are also central components of the cellular ma-
chinery that controls biological signaling. Recently scientists were enabled to inves-
tigate the properties of biological signaling networks such as their capacity to de-
tect, transduce, process and store information. It was found that cellular signaling 
pathways may also exhibit properties of emergent complexity. Such findings serve to 
demonstrate the impossibility to predict the dynamics of cellular signal transduction 
processes only on the basis of isolated signaling molecules and their individual mi-
croscopic actions. In order to develop an integrative, dynamical picture of biological 
signaling processes, therefore, it will be necessary to characterize the nonlinear rela-
tionships among the different molecular species making up the biochemical reaction 
networks, which control all aspects of cellular regulation as, for example, from RNA 
transcriptional control to cellular division.
Self-organization, that is the capacity of any complex living organism to in-
trinsically produce new properties and behaviors of organization and regulation, can-
not be addressed by purely reductionist approaches. Living organisms present the 
following two fundamental features. (1) They are thermodynamically open systems; 
that is, they are in a state of permanent flux, continuously exchanging energy and 
matter with their environment. (2) They are characterized by a complex organiza-
tion, which results from a vast network of molecular and cellular interactions involv-
ing a high degree of nonlinearity. Under appropriate conditions, the combination of 
these two features, openness and nonlinearity, enables complex systems to exhibit 
properties that are emergent or self-organizing. In biological systems, such proper-
ties may express themselves through the spontaneous formation, from (almost) ran-
dom molecular interactions, of long-range correlated, macroscopic dynamical pat-
terns in space and time – the process of self-organization. The dynamical states that 
result from self-organizing processes may have features such as excitability, bi-sta-
bility, periodicity, chaos or spatial-temporal patterns formation, and all of these can 
be observed in biological systems. 
Self-organizing processes may give rise to new, unexpected properties and 
behaviors in living systems, also called emergent properties. Emergent properties can 
be defined as properties that are possessed by a dynamical system as a whole but 
not by its constituent parts. Otherwise stated, emergent phenomena are phenom-
ena that are expressed at higher levels of organization in the system but not at the 
lower levels. The concept of self-organization implies the existence of a dynamical in-
terdependence between the molecular interactions at the microscopic level and the 
emerging global structure at the macroscopic level (see Karsenti 2008; and Misteli 
2001). In other words, there is an active combination of upward and downward pro-
cesses. The upward process indicates that, under non-equilibrium constraints, mo-
lecular interactions tend to spontaneously synchronize their behavior, which initiates 
the beginning of a collective, macroscopically ordered state. At the same time, the 
downward process indicates that the newly forming macroscopic state acts upon 
the microscopic interactions to force further synchronizations. Through the contin-
uing, energy-driven interplay between microscopic and macroscopic processes, the 
emergent, self-organizing structure is then stabilized and actively maintained.  
The above argument reveals that the origins and dynamics of emergent, 
macroscopic patterns, particularly in biological systems, cannot be simply deduced 
from the sum of the individual actions of the system’s microscopic elements. What is 
needed is an analysis of the system’s collective, macroscopic dynamics, which result 
from the complex web of molecular interactions between elements.
In spite of these theoretical and epistemological advances in the attempts 
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to obtain a better understanding of biological systems, the reductionist approach re-
mains dominant, and systems biology is often seen as no more than integration of 
diverse data into models of systems. Reductionism in biology, and especially in bio-
chemistry, has consisted in separating cell into their components, which were then 
separated into smaller components, and then studied in isolation. The reductionist 
stage was certainly necessary, but the time has come to move beyond this, beyond 
even studying the interactions of the components with one another, because all of 
them form parts of a whole, and their presence in the whole can only be understood 
by considering the need of the whole. As was recently emphasized by many scien-
tists (see Cornish-Bowden & Cárdenas 2005; Bains 2001), this way of thinking needs 
to be changed if systems biology is to lead to an understanding of life and to provide 
the benefits that are expected from it. The emphasis ought to be on the need of the 
system as a whole for understanding the components, not the converse. For example, 
general properties of metabolic systems, such as feedback inhibition, can be properly 
understood by taking account of supply and demand; i.e. the requirements of the sys-
tem as a whole (Cornish-Bowden & Cárdenas, 2005).
For long time, and especially in the last sixty years, biological science has 
privileged analytical method, i.e. the splitting up of the living systems into ever-small-
er units. Even systems biology has been recently characterized by most of molecular 
biologists as the integration of knowledge from diverse biological components and 
data into models of the system as a whole. In fact, this sort of definition is entirely re-
ductionist, and makes systems biology into little more than a euphemism for the type 
of approach that systems biology theorists criticized: instead of using a view of the 
whole system as a way to understand its components, it seeks to explain the whole 
in terms of a vast list of components. 
To show the effective causal role played by wholeness and systemic prop-
erties in biology, let us consider the three following examples (here we follow closely 
Cornish-Bowden and Cárdenas 2005). (1) The first concerns the many cases of coop-
erative feedback inhibition of metabolic pathways, which are now well-known, such 
as the inhibition of aspartokinase in bacteria by lysine. This type of observation is of-
ten explained by supposing that the biosynthetic flux is regulated by this feedback 
inhibition, and would be subject to uncontrolled variations if there were no feedback 
loop. However, as the previous mentioned authors pointed out, this explanation is 
wrong, because fluxes can be controlled perfectly well without feedback inhibition, 
whether cooperative or not. The need comes not from flux control but concentration 
control: without feedback inhibition in this pathway the rate at which lysine would 
be synthetized would still match the rate at which it is used in protein synthesis, but 
there would be huge and potentially damaging variations in the concentration of ly-
sine and the intermediates in the pathway from aspartate. This sensitivity of metabo-
lite concentrations to perturbations has major implications for the regulatory design 
of metabolism in living organisms. To understand this, it is necessary to represent bio-
synthesis pathways in a way that allows analysis in terms of supply and demand; that 
is to say, in a more complete way than is usually in textbooks of biochemistry. These 
typically show, for example, the biosynthesis of lysine as a series of reactions that be-
gin with aspartate and end with lysine. However, lysine is not in any meaningful sense 
the end-product: it is made not as an end in itself but as a starting material for other 
processes, principally, in this case, protein synthesis. As protein synthesis accounts 
for most of the metabolic demand for lysine, it determines the rate at which it needs 
to be synthetized from aspartate. Omitting the conversion of lysine into protein from 
the pathway means omitting the one step that explains the feedback inhibition of 
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aspartokinase by lysine. This inhibition cannot be explained solely in terms of the 
components concerned, aspartokinase and lysine, but requires consideration of the 
whole system, including protein synthesis. 
(2) The second example concerns the failure of genome sequencing to pro-
vide an effective explanation of how living organisms develop and evolve. There are 
at least two fundamental reasons for this failure. (i) The first is related to the essen-
tial fact that the expression of genome, i.e. its state of activity, stand beyond the gene 
sequences, and depend much more upon the peculiar spatial organization of the ge-
nome into the chromatin and the chromosome. Moreover, the functional properties 
of genomes are strongly determined by their cellular organization. It must be stressed 
the functional relevance of spatial and temporal genome organization at three in-
terdependent levels: the organization of nuclear processes; the organization of chro-
matin into higher-order domains; and the spatial arrangement of chromosomes and 
genes within the nuclear space. Each of these levels has regulatory potential, and all 
are interdependent. There is increasingly evidence that the higher-order, topological 
organization of the genomes exert fundamental influence on their functional prop-
erties, and on many cellular processes, including expression and genome stability (for 
more details, see Misteli, 2007; Cremer et al. 2006). 
(3) The third example regards the relationship between genotype and phe-
notype. We know that for more than half a century the prevalent ‘dogma’ was to 
think that the genotype completely and unidirectionally determine the phenotype 
and hence the fate of any complex living organism. Now, to be more precise, the 
problem is not much that genome sequences contain no phenotypic information, but 
that we do not have reliable methods for undertaking all of the steps involved in de-
ducing a phenotype from them. 
A list of putative gene products, or even a list of putative enzymes, is not a phenotype, and 
converting it into a phenotype requires construction of plausible metabolic map, which then 
need further work to convert it into a possible phenotype. Finally, the possible phenotype can 
only become a real phenotype when all relevant kinetic and regulatory properties are consid-
ered, together with information about how all the components are organized into a three-di-
mensional whole – even a four-dimensional whole, given that the times when different com-
ponents are made may be just as important as where they are placed (Cornish-Bowden, 2006).
III. Some remarks on the problem of causation in biological sciences
Complex living systems consist of several organizational levels, which often are in-
terdependent in different ways. This multi-layered organization poses the problem of 
causation, which is scientifically and philosophically profound. This is especially true 
for the metabolic, cellular and physiological systems, as well as for the nervous and 
cognitive systems. In all these systems upward and downward causation are causal-
ly interrelated. This important fact has led the heart physiologist Denis Noble to ar-
gue that there is no privileged level of causality in biological systems. Moreover, high-
er levels in biological systems exert their influence over the lower levels. Each level 
provides the boundary conditions under which the processes at lower levels operate. 
Without boundary conditions, biological functions would not exist (Noble 2012).
Studying the causal pathways in brain dynamics, the Sweden biologist Hans 
Liljenström remarks that downward causation from larger to smaller scales could 
be regarded as evidence that multi-level ‘both-way’ causation occurs (Liljenström 
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2016). He investigated, on the one hand, how cortical neurodynamics may depend on 
structural properties, such as connectivity and neuronal types, and on intrinsic and 
external signals and fluctuations; on the other, to what extent the complex neurody-
namics of cortical networks can influence the neural activity of single neurons. More 
precisely, Liljenström attempted to show that the neural activity at the microscopic 
level of single neurons is the basis for the neurodynamics at the mesoscopic network 
level, and fluctuations may sometimes trigger coherent spatial-temporal patterns of 
activity at this higher level. Irregular chaotic-like behavior can be generated by the 
interplay of neural excitatory and inhibitory activity at the network level. This com-
plex network dynamics, in turn, may influence the activity of single neurons, causing 
them to fire coherently or synchronously. Thus, Liljenström conclude: «this down-
ward causation is complementary to the upward causation» (2016, 189).
From simulation results, applying both to bottom-up mechanisms like 
noise-induced state transitions, and to top-down processes like network modulation 
of neural activity, Liljenström is led to stress that events and processes at microscop-
ic level of single neurons can influence the mesoscopic Neurodynamics of cortical 
networks, which in turn are associated with cognitive functions ate the macroscop-
ic level. 
It is apparent that internal noise can cause various phase transitions in the network dynamics, 
that may have effects on higher level functions. For example, an increased noise level in just a 
few network nodes can induce global synchronous oscillations in cortical networks and shift 
the system dynamics from one dynamical state to another. This in turn can change the effi-
ciency in the information processing of the system (185). 
This kind of situation, however, needs to be related (or can be correctly understood 
only in relation) to another important aspect of the neurodynamics of cortical net-
works. In fact, 
[…] neuromodulation, whether related to the level of arousal or as a consequence of attention, 
can regulate the cortical neurodynamics, and hence the activity of its constituent neurons. The 
firing patterns of single neurons are thus, to a certain degree, determined by the activity to 
the network level (and above). For example, neurons in visual cortex may fire synchronously 
and in phase, as a result of cholinergic modulation during attention (186). 
These arguments show clearly that the intricate web of interrelationships between 
different levels of neural organization, with inhibitory and excitatory feed-forward 
and feedback loops, with nonlinearities and thresholds, noise and chaos, makes any 
attempt to trace the causality of events and processes futile. In line with the ideas of 
Noble, it seems obvious that there is, in general, both upward and downward causa-
tion in biological systems, including the nervous system. This also makes it impossible 
to say that mental processes are simply caused by neural processes, without any in-
fluence from the mental on the neural. R. W. Sperry already stressed this crucial point 
when he wrote: 
A traditional working hypothesis in neuroscience holds that a complete account of brain 
function is possible, in principle, in strictly neurophysiological terms without invoking con-
scious or mental agents; the neural correlates of subjective experience are conceived to ex-
ert causal influence but no mental qualities per se. This long-established materialist-behav-
iorist principle has been challenged in recent years by the introduction of a modified concept 
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of the mind-brain relation in which consciousness is conceived to be emergent and causal. 
Psychophysical interaction is explained in terms of the emergence in nesting brain hierar-
chies of high order, functionally derived, mental properties that interact by laws and prin-
ciples different from, and not reducible to those of neurophysiology. Reciprocal upward and 
downward, interlevel determination of the mental and neural action is accounted for on these 
terms without violating the principles of scientific explanation and without reducing the qual-
ities of inner experience to those of physiology. Interaction of mind and brain becomes not 
only conceivable and scientifically tenable, but more plausible in some respects that were the 
older parallelist and identity views of the materialist position 
(Sperry 1980, 195). 1
In the light of the last remark, it might appear quite meaningless the debate on the 
philosophical distinction between the ‘functionalist’ version and the ‘monist’ version 
of (‘non-reductive’ ‘physicalism’). While in the first version, one maintains that men-
tal phenomena are realized in physical properties and processes, in the monist version 
one holds that every event that can be given a mental description can also be given a 
physical description (see Sperry 1980; Eccles 1970 and 1986). In either version, even 
though there are no scientific laws by which mental phenomena could be ‘reduced’ to 
physical phenomena, the underlying causality of the world remains entirely physical.
In life sciences, we need to rethink the concept of biological causality in 
newly, more profound terms. One key point is that higher-level phenomena cannot 
be understood simply by analyzing the lower levels. The importance of systems biol-
ogy is connected to the limitations of molecule-centered approaches. Systems biolo-
gy has shifted the focus from identification and characterization of molecular com-
ponents towards and understanding of networks and functional activity. However, 
a further significant shift remains to be done: re-focusing our attention away from 
pathway-centered approaches to an understanding of complex multilevel systems. 
In other words, our understanding of cellular functions must be integrated across 
multiple levels of structural and functional organization: from cell tissues and organs 
to the whole organism, and from cell functions (growth, proliferation, differentiation 
and apoptosis) to the physiology of organs or the human body. To quote H. Kacser 
(1986), “to understand the whole, one must study the whole”. The idea is that, if you 
want to understand a tissue, you need to study it as a whole. Now, organs and tissues 
are multi-level systems manifesting both ‘bottom-up’ determination and ‘top-down’ 
determination: the whole (organ or tissue) is the product of the parts (tissues or cells, 
respectively), but the parts in turn depend upon the whole for their own functioning 
and maintenance. In more philosophical terms, this means that higher-level systems 
in biological phenomena may change in very significant ways properties of lower-lev-
el systems or entities. In other words, these entities behave at lower levels in novel 
and irreducible ways.
Following O. Wolkenhauer and A. Muir (2011), we stress that living systems, 
from organisms to organs, tissues and cells are phenomena of organized complexi-
ty whose relationships and properties are largely determined by their function as a 
whole. The tissues of our human body are self-organizing systems: every cell owes 
its role to the action of all its surrounding cells, and also exists for the sake of the 
others. The whole (tissue) and its parts (cells) reciprocally determine functioning of 
each other. For instance, the pacemaker rhythm of the heart is not only caused by 
the activity of the ions channels at the molecular level, but is also dependent on the 
functioning of the organ, and even the body, as a whole. The systems biologist Denis 
Noble demonstrated the importance of such downward causation in simulations of 
1 See also Eccles (1986).
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the heart rhythm, where feedback from cell voltage was removed and fluctuations 
in ion current ceased. To understand such phenomena in multi-level systems, it is not 
only important to understand molecular mechanisms but also to understand the or-
ganizational maintenance of the system at higher levels.
IV. On the role of loops of interactions and emergent properties  
in biological systems
The aim of this section is to at highlight the importance of a systems biology approach. 
System biology is about interactions rather than about constituents, although know-
ing the constituents of the system under study may be a prerequisite for starting 
description and modeling. Interactions often bring about new properties or emer-
gent properties. For instance, a system may start oscillating although the constitu-
ent alone would not. Another important example is that evolutionary biologists have 
wondered for long jump-like transitions can occur in evolution. From the viewpoint 
of systems theory, the answer arises from bifurcations. In a non-linear system, at 
certain points in parameter space, called critical points, bifurcations occur, that is, a 
small change in a parameter leads to a qualitative change in system behavior, e.g. a 
switch from steady state to oscillation. It is clear that the number of potential inter-
actions within a system is far greater than the number of constituents. If only pair-
wise interactions were allowed, the former number would be n2 if the latter number 
were denoted by n. The number of interactions is even larger if interactions within 
triples and larger sets are allowed, as is the case in multi-protein complexes. 
In the sense of systems biology, a biological phenomenon or being is a sy-
stem if emergent properties result from it. Genomics has certainly been a very im-
portant and fruitful undertaking and gave us much new insights into molecular bi-
ology. However, much of molecular biology is based on reductionism and simple 
determinism. It is an extreme exaggeration to say that the human genome has been 
deciphered. Besides the fact that not all ORFs functions have been assigned yet, it 
should be acknowledged that even if all functions were known, we would be far from 
understanding the phenomenon of life because knowledge of all the individual gene 
products does not say much about the interactions between them, and even less does 
about the content and meaning of such interactions. According to a system’s view of 
life, the study of the dynamics and interaction networks is essential for understand-
ing the ways in which living organisms regulate their cellular activity and organize 
their physiological growth. One of the major goals of systems biology is to find ap-
propriate ways of diagramming and mathematically describing the specific, complex 
interactions within and between living cells. Because complex systems have emer-
gent properties, their behavior cannot be understood or predicted simply by analyz-
ing the structure of their components. The constituents of a complex system interact 
in many ways, including negative feedback and feed-forward control, which lead to 
dynamic features that cannot be captured satisfactorily by linear mathematical mod-
els that disregard cooperativity and non-additive effects. In view of the complexity 
of informational pathways and networks, new types of mathematics are required for 
modeling these systems (for more details, see Boi 2005 and 2011). 
It is worth of noticing that the specificity of a complex biological activi-
ty does not arise from the specificity of the individual molecules that are involved, 
as these components frequently function in many different processes. For instance, 
genes that affect memory formation in the fruit fly encode proteins in the cyclic 
AMP (cAMP) signaling pathway that are not specific to memory. It is the particular 
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cellular compartment and environment in which a second messenger, such as a cAMP, 
is released that allow a gene product to have a unique effect. Biological specificity 
results from the way in which these components assemble and function together. 
Interactions between the parts, as well as influences from the environment, give rise 
to new features, such as network behavior which are absent in the isolated compo-
nents. Consequently, emergence has appeared as a new concept that complements 
“reduction” when reduction fails. Emergent properties resist any attempt at being pre-
dicted or deduced by explicit calculation or any other means.
V. Reductionism and emergence
The reductionist method consists in analyzing biological systems by dissecting it into 
their constituent parts and determining the mechanistic (physicochemical) connec-
tions between the parts. The reductionists assume that the isolated molecules and 
their structure have sufficient explanatory power to provide an understanding of the 
whole system. This radical deterministic standpoint was advocated by Francis Crick 
by claiming that «The ultimate aim of the modern movement in biology (he refers of 
course to molecular biology) is to explain all biology in terms of physics and chemis-
try» (1970, 561). Such reductionist mindset arises from the belief that because bio-
logical systems are composed solely of atoms and molecules, without the influence 
of other kinds of forces or laws, it should be possible to explain them using the phys-
icochemical properties of their individual components, down to the atomic level. The 
most extreme manifestation of the reductionist view is the belief that is held by neu-
roscientists (see Changeux 1983) that consciousness and mental states can be re-
duced to chemical reactions that occurs in the brain. In the recent decades many bi-
ologists have become increasingly critical of the idea that biological systems can be 
fully explained using only physics and chemistry. And, in fact, there is now important 
evidence that the biology, development, physiology, behavior or fate of a human be-
ing cannot be adequately explained by the reductionist standpoint that considers only 
(classical or not) physical and chemical laws. A more open and integrative approach 
considers biology as an autonomous discipline that requires its own entities and con-
cepts that are not (necessarily and completely) found in physics and chemistry. 
 Biological complexity and specificity results from the way in which single 
components like molecules, genes and cells self-organize and function together when 
constituting a whole (a tissue, an organ, an organism), say a whole system including 
different subsystems.  Not only the interactions between the parts and the influence 
from the environment (think of epigenetic factors, both chemical and spatial, that 
mediate the complex relationship between the genomes and the micro- and macro 
biophysical environments), but also the systemic properties of the whole that exert 
an action on the components, give rise to new features, such as network behavior 
and functional properties, which are absent in the isolated components.
This means that we need to consider ‘emergence’ as an effective new con-
cept that complements ‘reduction’ when reduction fails, and allow to consider those 
specific systemic properties of the whole responsible for biological organization and 
regulation at higher levels. Emergent properties o not result from properties pertain-
ing to simple components of biological systems. They resist any attempt at being 
predicated or deduced by explicitly calculation or any other analytical means. In this 
regard, emergent properties differ from ‘resultant’ properties, which can be predicted 
from lower-level components. 
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For instance, the resultant mass of a multi-component protein assembly is simply equal to 
the sum of the masses of each individual component. However, the way in which we taste the 
saltiness of sodium chloride is not reducible to the properties of sodium and chlorine gas. An 
important aspect of emergent properties is that they have their own causal power, which is 
not reducible to the powers of their constituents. For instance, the experience of pain can al-
ter human behavior, but the lower-level chemical reactions in the neurons that are involved in 
the perception of pain are not the cause of the altered behavior, as the pain itself has a causal 
efficacy (Van Regenmortel 2004, 146). 
Advocating the reductionist idea of ‘upward causation’ means to maintain that mo-
lecular components and states suffice to determine higher-level processes occurring 
in biological systems. However, without denying a certain role of methodological re-
ductionism in science, today we are led to recognize the important role played by the 
concept of emergence in many fields of the natural and life sciences, as well as to ac-
cept ‘downward causation’ by which higher-level systems and processes influence 
lower-level configurations and entities. Emergence is essentially linked to the intrinsic 
and peculiar complexity of living systems. The existence of emergent properties is an 
outcome of the complexity of living systems. In other words, in order to solve the in-
creasingly complexity, linked to the stages of the developments of tissues and organs 
and the construction of global physiological systems, living multicellular organisms 
self-organize giving thus rise to newly, needed regulatory and functional properties. 
VI. Many levels of causation are needed for thinking the biological com-
plexity and functionality.
Many theoretical ideas and experimental findings in life science over the last three 
decades lead to review profoundly the ideas about properties and behaviors of bio-
logical systems. Among them, maybe the most important is the principle of causality 
in biological sciences, as it has been conceived by molecular biology. This fundamental 
issue is raised by Denis Noble when he asks: «Must higher level biological processes al-
ways be derivable from lower level data and mechanisms, as assumed by the idea that 
an organism is completely defined by its genome? Or are higher level properties nec-
essarily also causes of lower level behavior, involving, actions and interactions both 
ways?» (2011, 1). According to Noble, 
[…] downward causation is necessary and this form of causation can be represented as the in-
fluences of initial and boundary conditions on the solutions of the differential equations used 
to represent the lower level processes. (…) A priori, there is no privileged level of causation. (…) 
Biological relativity can be seen as an extension of the relativity principle in physics by avoiding 
the assumption that there is a privileged scale at which biological functions are determined (1). 
There is increasingly evidence, experimental and theoretical, of the existence of 
downward causation from larger to smaller scales. Today, one is enabled to visualize 
exactly how multilevel ‘both-way’ causation occurs. There is none a priori reason why 
one level in a biological system should be privileged over other levels when it comes to 
causation. There are various forms of downward causation that regulates lower level 
components in biological systems.
Looking more closely to molecular biology, the essence of the central dog-
ma is that ‘coding’ between genes and proteins in one-way. It would be better the 
word ‘template’ to ‘coding’ since ‘coding’ already implies a program. The concept of 
P
hi
lo
so
ph
y 
K
it
ch
en
 #
11
 —
 A
nn
o
 7
 —
 S
et
te
m
br
e 
20
19
 —
 IS
S
N
: 2
38
5-
19
45
 —
 P
ar
ti
, i
ns
ie
m
i e
 s
is
te
m
i. 
Il
 c
on
ce
tt
o
 d
i e
m
er
g
en
za
 in
 fi
lo
so
fi
a
 124
O
n
 em
erg
ence and
 causality in
 the living
 w
orld
 —
 L
uciano
 B
oi
a genetic program is indeed one of the most relevant problem of molecular biology 
because there is no a genetic program at all. The argument runs as follow (for more 
details, see Noble 2011). The sequence of DNA triplets form templates for the pro-
duction of different amino acid sequences in proteins. Amino acid sequences do not 
form templates for the production of DNA sequences. What was shown by Crick, 
Watson and their followers is that template works in only one direction, which makes 
the gene appear primary. So, what the genome really causes? The coding sequences 
form a list of proteins and RNAs that might be made in a given organism. According 
to Noble
These parts of the genome form a database of templates. To be sure, as a database, the genome 
is also extensively formatted, with many regulatory elements, operons, embedded within it. 
These regulatory elements enable groups of genes to be coordinated in their expression levels. 
And we know that the non-coding parts of the genome also play important regulatory func-
tions. But the genome is not a fixed program in the sense in which such a computer program 
was defined when Monod and Jacob introduced the idea of the “genetic program” (programme 
génétique) in the sixties. It is rather a ‘read-write’ memory that can be organized in response 
to cellular and environmental signals. Which proteins and RNAs are made when and where is 
not fully specified. This is why it is possible for the 200 or so different cell types using exact-
ly the same genome. A heart cell is made using precisely the same genome in its nucleus as a 
bone cell, a liver cell, pancreatic cell, etc. Impressive regulatory circuits have been constructed 
by those who favor a genetic program view of development, but these are not independent of 
the ‘programming’ that the cells, tissues and organs themselves uses to epigenetically control 
the genome and the patterns of gene expression appropriate to 
each cell and tissue type in multicellular organism (2011, 3). 2
The important point to stress is that the circuits of major biological functions neces-
sarily include non-genome elements. This tells us that the genome alone is far from 
being sufficient. Barbara McClintock (1984) first described the genome as ‘an organ of 
the cell’. Indeed, DNA sequences do absolutely nothing until they are triggered to do 
so by a variety of transcriptions factors, which turn genes ‘on and off’ by binding to 
their regulatory sites, and various other forms of epigenetic control, including meth-
ylation of certain cytosines and interactions with the tails of the histones that form 
the protein backbone of the chromosomes. All of these, and the cellular, tissue and 
organ processes that determine when they are produced and used, ‘control’ the ge-
nome. In the neurosciences, a good example of downward causation is what neuro-
scientists call electro-transcription coupling, since it involves the transmission of in-
formation from the neural synapses to the nuclear DNA. 
So, there is strong evidence that the genome does not completely determine 
the organisms. Multi-cellular organisms use the same genome to generate all the 200 
or so different types of cell in their bodies by activating different expression patterns. 
The regulatory parts of the genome are essential in order the genome be activated. 
The mechanisms and patterns of activation are just as much part of the organism’s 
construction and the genome itself. It is time to recognize that there exist various 
forms of downward causation that regulates lower level components in biological 
systems. In addition to the controls internal to the organism, we also have to consid-
er the influence of the environment on all the levels. Causation is, therefore, two-way. 
A downward form of causation is not a simple reverse form of upward causation. 
It is better seen as completing a feedback loop that expresses a functional integra-
tion of the various levels of causation, including in particular the concentrations and 
2 See also Noble (2008; 2006).
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locations of transcription and post-transcription factors, and the relevant epigenet-
ic influences. All those forms of downward causation naturally consider the role of 
cell and tissue signaling in the generation of organizing principles involved in embry-
onic induction, originally identified in the pioneering work of Hans Spemann and Ilde 
Mangold (1924). The existence of such induction is itself an example of dependence 
on boundary conditions, that is those conditions which define what constraints are 
imposed on a biological system by its environment. That because boundary condi-
tions are somehow involved in determining initial conditions (the state of the com-
ponents of the system at the time at which we start analyzing and modelling it), they 
can therefore be considered as a form of downward causation. The induction mech-
anisms emerge as the embryo interacts with its environment. Morphogenesis cannot 
be explained only by the genome. Put in different terms, the emergence of new mor-
phological and physiological forms in the embryo of a human being cannot be derived 
and understood from the level of the genome. 
There is real (‘strong’) emergence because contingency beyond what is in 
the genome, i.e. in its environment, also determine what happens at the higher lev-
el of morphogenesis. Multi-cellular organisms are multi-level systems, and each lev-
el, from molecules and cells to tissues and organs, possesses a specific organization 
with increasing complexity when one passes to higher order systems. This organiza-
tion has causal power. The idea of multicellular causation considers seriously the fact 
that complex organization of highest levels, such as the global properties and activity 
of cells and the systemic properties and state of organisms, may act on the functions 
of the components, particularly genes and proteins. Downward causation leads us to 
shift our focus away from the gene as the unit of development and evolution to that 
of the whole organism. It might be that the concept of downward causation will play 
an important role in the reappraising of the mind-body problem (how and why men-
tal states may act on neural states), and in the philosophy of perception and action 
(perceptual global effects, intentionality, free will, etc.). Finally, we need to stress that 
one of the major theoretical and experimental outcomes of multilevel modelling is 
that causation in biological systems runs in both directions: upward from the genome 
and downward from all other levels. There are feed-forward and feedback loops be-
tween the different levels of causation.
To conclude, we would like to stress the fundamental fact that organisms 
are more than, and a reality profoundly different from the genes that look after their 
assembly. Mechanical, chemical and cultural inputs from the environment, epigenet-
ic cues, also have an effect on the final phenotype. In fact, continued environmen-
tal influences on the adult phenotype continue to affect its characteristics. The open 
question is whether the epigenetic cues can become causative agents of phenotypic 
modifications. Within a biological multi-level, astonishing complex reality, higher lev-
els result from lower-level processes (genes up to phenotype), and lower levels re-
sult from higher-levels processes (organism’s properties to epigenetics mechanisms 
of genes expression and regulation), so that upward and downward causation are in 
different ways and in both directions deeply interlaced. Some epigenomic cues seem 
to be assimilated into the genome, as already C. H. Waddington showed (1953; see 
also Boi, 2009). The evolved genome therefore incorporates epigenomic cues or the 
expectation of their arrival. Genomes are more than linear sequences, in fact, they 
exist as elaborate spatial and physical structures, and their functional properties are 
strongly determined by their cellular organization and by the interactions that organ-
isms develop with the environment.
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